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Abstract
Recent empirical findings attribute a central role to the degree of economic open-
ness to determine the size of the fiscal multiplier. See for instance Ilzetzki, Mendoza &
Végh (2013). However, traditional macroeconomic models have difficulties to account for
this evidence. By introducing ‘deep-habit’ formation into a New Keynesian small open
economy model, this paper provides a theoretical framework which is able to attest for
the new empirical evidence. Deep habits give rise to counter-cyclical firm markups,
which are crucial to generate effects of openness on the fiscal multiplier as found in the
data. We study three dimensions of economic openness: Exchange rate flexibility, trade
openness and capital mobility. In line with the empirical findings, we report a negative
relationship between measures of economic openness and the fiscal multiplier.
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1 Introduction
With the process of worldwide economic integration – characterized by the adoption of flexible
exchange rate arrangements, further trade integration through the reduction of trade barriers, and
higher capital mobility – economic openness has become a determining factor of the effectiveness
of fiscal stimuli. In a series of recent empirical studies, the evidence attributes a central role to the
degree of economic openness for the size of the fiscal multiplier.1 For instance, the impact of the
exchange rate regime on the fiscal multiplier has been studied by Corsetti, Meier & Müller (2012b),
Ilzetzki et al. (2013), and Born, Juessen & Müller (2013). Although different in terms of econometric
methods and data samples, they find that fiscal policy is more effective when the exchange rate is
pegged. Regarding the degree of trade openness, Karras (2012) and Ilzetzki et al. (2013) have shown
that higher openness leads to lower effectiveness of fiscal expansions. Capital mobility has attracted
less attention in its role as a determinant for the fiscal multiplier. A notable exception is given by
Dellas, Neusser & Wälti (2005), yet the empirical evidence provided therein remains inconclusive.
While there is ample empirical evidence, the substantial role of economic openness has been
largely neglected in the theoretical analysis of fiscal policy. It is the objective of this paper to
provide a framework which emphasizes the role of three different measures of economic openness,
namely exchange rate flexibility, openness to trade, and capital mobility, to determine the size of
the fiscal multiplier.
The effectiveness of fiscal policy in open economies depends on the response of the real exchange
rate to an increase in government spending. Both Monacelli & Perotti (2010) and Ravn, Schmitt-
Grohé & Uribe (2012) report as a result of their empirical analysis a real depreciation of domestic
currency in response to a fiscal expansion.2 These studies do not discriminate for the exchange rate
regime. In a related study, Corsetti et al. (2012b) show that the impact of a fiscal expansion on the
real exchange rate is crucially affected by the underlying economic structures and by the exchange
rate policy. From a theoretical perspective, these empirical findings have questioned the predictions
of classic macroeconomic models such as the textbook Mundell-Fleming framework.3 While the
latter suggests that fiscal policy is more effective under fixed exchange rates, it cannot account for
an empirically consistent role of the real exchange rate, namely a real depreciation of the domestic
currency. This is one aspect to which our model is aimed to contribute, to provide a response of
the real exchange rate which within a small open economy model (qualitatively) depends on the
exchange rate regime and therefore is consistent with Corsetti et al. (2012b).
An important ingredient of our model is borrowed from Ravn et al. (2012). According to the
traditional real business cycle literature, private consumption decreases significantly in response to
1There exists a vast and growing literature on the effectiveness of fiscal policy in general. As we focus only on the
relationship of fiscal policy and economic openness, we restrict ourselves to name just a selection of influential papers.
For theoretical contributions see for example Baxter & Stockman (1989), Perotti (2008), Hall (2009), Woodford (2011) or
Canzoneri, Collard, Dellas & Diba (2012). For a survey of empirical contributions, see Ramey (2011).
2See also for example Kollmann (2010) and Bénétrix & Lane (2013).
3We refer here to an open economy baseline IS-LM model as it is outlined for example in the textbook by Blanchard
(2013).
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a fiscal expansion as a consequence of a negative wealth effect, a conclusion for which the empirical
counterpart is rarely found.4 In order to solve this theoretical challenge, Ravn et al. (2012) enrich
the modeling of private and public households via the implementation of deep-habit formation. We
exploit their mechanism to generate effects of openness on the multiplier which are in line with the
empirical literature.
In the light of the above, we develop a stochastic general equilibrium model accounting for the
three mentioned dimensions of economic openness and we analyze their implications for the fiscal
multiplier. Following Ravn, Schmitt-Grohé & Uribe (2006) and Ravn et al. (2012), we introduce
‘deep-habit’ formation into this model. Deep-habit formation means that households form a con-
sumption routine over narrow categories of goods such as clothing, vacation destinations, music, or
cars. Habit formation is considered to be external, hence people adopt the preferences of a particular
group based on learning, social concerns (e.g. identification), or brand credibility.5 This household
behavior provides firms with an incentive to set their markup counter-cyclically: An increase in ag-
gregate demand makes the individual demand of the monopolistically competitive producer more
elastic such that firms can increase future demand by lowering the current markup. In other words,
if government expenditures increase, markups decline. Lower markups, in turn, shift the labor
demand curve outward, and thus increase the real wage. This provides the household with an in-
centive to increase consumption while decreasing leisure. Hence, the negative wealth effect induced
by a fiscal expansion can be compensated if this substitution effect is strong enough. It is precisely
the combination of deep habits with economic openness that distinguishes our theoretical exercise
and the novelty of our results.
We depart from Ravn et al. (2012) in three main aspects. First, we introduce monopolistic compe-
tition in the market of domestic goods and nominal rigidities in the form of price adjustment costs
for domestic firms.6 Price rigidity is an important feature of this model, because it causes the firms
to change their markup through a ‘wage channel’ to a larger extent than a ‘price channel’ and as
it allows us to explain the effect of monetary accommodation on the fiscal multiplier. Next, rather
than having a two-country setup, we deploy a small open economy framework with imperfect in-
ternational financial markets. We follow Schmitt-Grohé & Uribe (2003) by assuming that adjusting
the bond portfolio is costly. This assumption allows us to study the role of capital mobility. Finally,
we give a specific role to monetary policy. Importantly, this variation permits us to investigate the
accommodation by the central bank in response to a fiscal expansion.
Qualitatively, our model reproduces the patterns found in the recent empirical literature. First,
the fiscal multiplier is higher when the exchange rate is pegged rather than floating. Second, trade
openness diminishes the effectiveness of fiscal policy. Third, higher capital mobility leads to a lower
4The effect of government spending on private consumption has received considerable attention. See for example:
Linnemann (2006), Gali, López-Salido & Vallés (2007) or Hall (2009).
5Chintagunta, Kyriazidou & Perktold (2001) provide a recent survey of the empirical evidence on habitual consump-
tion behavior.
6The introduction of deep habits to a framework with nominal rigidities is not new. Both Cantore, Levine, Melina
& Yang (2012) and Zubairy (2014a) develop New Keynesian models with deep-habit formation. The former test its
implication for optimal monetary policy and the latter study equilibrium determinacy under different interest rate rules.
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fiscal multiplier. Summing up, economic openness decreases the fiscal multiplier. The intuition
lies in the way the three different dimensions of economic openness affect how firms set their
markups and how the monetary authority reacts to it, which in turn changes the response of labor,
consumption, the trade balance and the real exchange rate to an increase in government spending.
In our model, lower economic openness leads to less of the domestic fiscal expansion passing off
to the foreign economy: Under flexible exchange rates, the central bank reacts to falling CPI inflation
after an increase in government spending by lowering the nominal interest rate.7 The domestic
currency appreciates, causing a deterioration in the trade balance, partly offsetting the stimulating
effect of the fiscal expansion. With a strict exchange rate target, the central bank loses the interest
rate as a policy instrument such that a fiscal expansion causes a real depreciation of the domestic
currency. In turn, the trade balance improves, enhancing the effect on output. If the consumption
pattern of domestic households exhibits a home bias (and hence a smaller degree of openness to
trade), the crowding-out effect of the trade balance is reduced because of an expenditure-switching
effect. That is, when households are less likely to substitute their consumption of domestic goods
for imports, the trade balance deteriorates less, resulting in a larger fiscal multiplier. Finally, the
degree of capital mobility directly affects the portfolio allocation of households. The more costly
the re-allocation of the portfolio towards foreign bonds, the less the households‘ demand for these
bonds changes. Consequently, decreasing the degree of capital mobility leads to less real exchange
rate appreciation, implying less crowding-out of the trade balance and thus a higher fiscal multiplier.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the derivation of the model.
Section 3 shows its calibration, and Section 4 presents the main results. In Section 5, we discuss the
transmission mechanism of the fiscal policy shock. We turn to the role of economic openness for
the determination of the fiscal multiplier in Section 6. Section 7 concludes.
2 Model
This section presents the main dynamic model. The model is a standard New-Keynesian small
open economy model with Rotemberg price stickiness, and its only departure in this respect is the
introduction of good-specific habit formation in consumption and government spending along the
lines of Ravn et al. (2006, 2012). Such a model is useful as we lay our focus on trade openness, capital
mobility and the exchange rate regime and hereby mimic particular characterizations of small open
economies such as Canada, Norway or New Zealand.8
The modeled economy consists of four building blocks. First, there is a representative household
who maximizes its utility over both a bundle of domestic and foreign goods, which are internation-
ally traded, and over leisure. The household’s degree of home bias in consumption represents
7See Davig & Leeper (2011), Coenen, Erceg, Freedman, Furceri, Kumhof, Lalonde, Laxton, Lindé, Mourougane &
Muir (2012) or Christiano, Eichenbaum & Rebelo (2011) for a discussion of the accommodation channel and its role for
the transmission mechanism of fiscal policy shocks.
8Examples of similar models include McCallum & Nelson (2000), Devereux, Lane & Xu (2006) and Lim & McNelis
(2008).
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our measure of trade openness.9 The household has access to domestic and foreign bonds. To
model capital mobility, we introduce convex portfolio adjustment costs of foreign bonds as a part of
the household’s budget constraint. Second, there is a government which finances its consumption
expenditures via a lump-sum tax.10 Third, there is a continuum of monopolistically competitive
producers who incur price adjustment costs. Fourth, we model a monetary authority following a
standard interest rate rule targeting inflation, the output gap, and the exchange rate. In order to
keep the model tractable, we assume that the (large) foreign economy is exogenous.
2.1 Households
Following Ravn et al. (2012), the representative domestic household consumes a composite good of
domestically produced individual goods, xdc,t, and a composite good of foreign individual goods,
x fc,t.
11 These two composite goods are combined to xct , the final index which is an argument of the
utility function of the household:
xct =
[
ω(xdc,t)
1−1/ξ + (1−ω)(x fc,t)1−1/ξ
]1/(1−1/ξ)
. (2.1)
It is an aggregator function with constant elasticity of substitution, as discussed by Dixit & Stiglitz
(1977). Here, ξ ∈ (1, ∞) denotes the elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign goods.
Parameter ω ∈ [0, 1] measures the relative importance of domestic goods in the consumption basket
and has two interesting interpretations: First, it measures the degree of home bias in consumption.
ω > 0 indicates a home bias because otherwise, with a continuum of monopolistically competitive
firms, the percentage of domestic goods in the consumption basket should be infinitely small. Sec-
ond, 1− ω can be seen as a natural measure of trade openness of the economy (i.e., the higher is ω,
the more closed is the economy).12 By construction, ω is unrelated to the actual substitutability of
domestic and foreign goods with respect to observable features other than the country of origin.
Think of people wanting to buy a domestically produced good rather than a foreign one just be-
cause it comes from their own country, even if the goods themselves are identical. In the case where
domestic and foreign goods are perfect substitutes (ξ → ∞ and hence xct → ωxdc,t +(1−ω)x
f
c,t), it is
only the home bias, ω, and the prices which decide how the households allocate their budget across
domestic and foreign goods.13 On the other hand if ξ → 1, meaning that domestic and foreign
goods are complements, decreasing marginal utility attained both from consuming domestic goods
9By the term “home bias” we refer to household’s preference for domestic over foreign goods.
10Government spending does neither yield utility to the households, nor does it serve as a productive input to the
firms.
11Throughout the text, the following conventions in terms of notation will be met: The subscript t denotes the time
period, the superscripts d and f denote that a variable belongs to the domestic or the foreign economy, respectively. That
is, d ( f ) refers to goods produced by the domestic (foreign) economy. All variables are scalars, they are denoted in italics,
and have a time period subscript. Constants/parameters are likewise denoted in italics but do not have a time subscript.
12In general, the parameter ω is comprised of two parts: (i) the extent of trade openness, ϑ; and (ii) the country size
n. ω is then defined by ω ≡ ϑ(1− n). We take a shortcut by assuming that we are in the limiting case in which n → 0.
A similar distinction between country size and trade openness is used, for example, in Gali & Monacelli (2005), Faia &
Monacelli (2008) and Benigno & De Paoli (2010).
13In this extreme case where ξ → ∞: If ω/(1−ω) > Pdt /(etP
f
t ), the household buys domestic goods only.
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and from consuming foreign goods implies that consumers want to consume a mix of domestic and
foreign goods, even if their home bias is strong.
2.1.1 Habit formation
The distinctive feature of this economy from the traditional New Keynesian small open economy
framework is that the household and the government form consumption habits over individual
goods. The two composite goods xdc,t and x
f
c,t, which together form the index x
c
t , are habit-adjusted.
Habit-adjustment, besides the very utility function to be defined below, is a further component
which directly affects the way the household derives utility from consumption. Following the
example of Ravn et al. (2006, 2012), deep habits are formed at the level of each individual variety i
of domestic and foreign goods. Habit formation is external to the individual household, meaning
that households are trying to ‘catch up with the Joneses’. Technically, we implement this mechanism
by assuming that the habit stock of the domestic good of variety i, denoted by sdc,t(i), creates a gap
between xdc,t(i) and c
d
t (i). The latter denotes the actual (not habit-adjusted) amount of output of
variety i consumed by the household. Sticking to the case of domestic goods for the explanation of
the mechanism, each variety i belongs to the set {d} of domestically produced goods. Let
xdc,t =
{∫ 1
0
[
cdt (i)− θcsdc,t−1(i)
]1−1/η
di
}1/(1−1/η)
, (2.2)
in which θc ∈ [0, 1) measures the intensity of habit formation, and η > 1 denotes the elasticity
of substitution across varieties. The mirror images are given with respect to exports, cd?t (i), and
imports, c ft (i). From a technical point of view, the marginal utility derived by the households from
one unit of variety i increases with the habit stock built on variety i in the past. From an economic
point of view, this gives the household an incentive to consume more of variety i today if it has
consumed i yesterday. This mechanism has important implications on how firms set their markups,
as we will discuss below. The habit stock evolves according to
sdc,t(i) = ρs
d
c,t−1(i) + (1− ρ)c̄dc,t(i). (2.3)
c̄dc,t(i) is the average amount of output of variety i consumed per household and ρ measures the
degree of habit persistence. Hence, for a given level of xdc,t, the household chooses c
d
t (i) to minimize
its total expenditure on domestic goods,
∫ 1
0 P
d
t (i)c
d
t (i)di, subject to equation (2.2). This yields the
demand functions of the domestic household:
cdt (i) =
(
Pdt (i)
Pt
)−η
xdc,t + θ
csdc,t−1(i), (2.4)
c ft (i) =
(
etP
f
t (i)
Pt
)−η
x fc,t + θ
cs fc,t−1(i). (2.5)
The former equation is the household’s demand for the domestic good, and the latter shows the
demand for the foreign good of variety i (i.e., the demand for imports). This latter equation is
derived analogously to its domestic counterpart, as households form habits for foreign goods
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in the same manner as for domestic goods. Note that the price elasticity of demand εc,jt (i) =
−[∂cjt(i)/∂pt(i)][pt(i)/c
j
t(i)] for j ∈ {d, f } is time-dependent. In the symmetric equilibrium, we
have εc,jt = η(1− θcc
j
t−1/c
j
t). This is in contrast to models without deep habit formation, where
θc = 0, so that the price elasticity of demand is constant and equal to η. As will be shown in Section
2.3, the time-varying nature of the price elasticity has important implications for the price setting
behavior of the firms.
The expenditure of the household in period t to cover its habits carried over from (t− 1) amount
to vdc,t = θ
c
∫ 1
0 P
d
t (i)s
d
c,t−1di and v
f
c,t = θ
c
∫ 1
0 etP
f
t (i)s
f
c,t−1di, and it holds that P
d
t x
d
c,t + v
d
c,t = P
d
t c
d
t and
etP
f
t x
f
c,t + v
f
c,t = etP
f
t c
f
t . The household takes this amount as given for its decision at time t.
2.1.2 Utility maximization
The household chooses a set of variables H =
{
xdc,t, x
f
c,t, ht, B
d
t , B
f
t
}
in order to maximize the
present value of its present and future utility Ut(xct , ht) ∀ t ∈ [0, ∞) subject to a budget constraint
max
H
Et
 ∞∑j=0 βj
 (xct+j)1−σ − 1
1− σ − ψ
h1+φt+j
1 + φ
 , 0 < φ; 0 ≤ σ, ψ; 0 < β < 1,
s.t. Pdt x
d
c,t + v
d
c,t + etP
f
t x
f
c,t + v
f
c,t + Pt(B
d
t + etB
f
t ) =
Wtht − Tt + Pt−1(Rt−1Bdt−1 + etR?t−1B
f
t−1)−
χ
2
Pt(etB
f
t )
2 +Ft ,
in which β is the discount factor, σ is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, and φ is the
inverse labor supply elasticity. ψ gives the weight of disutility the household derives from working.
Households divide their total time endowment, lt + ht = 1, into leisure, lt, and hours worked,
ht ∈ (0, 1). Bdt is a one-period domestic bond, which is not traded internationally and is in zero
net supply at the domestic household level. B ft is a traded one-period foreign bond denominated
in the foreign currency. Pdt denotes the price of the domestic composite good, P
f
t is the price of
the foreign composite good, Pt the domestic consumer price index, et the nominal exchange rate
(in price notation), Wt the nominal wage rate, Tt a lump-sum tax, Rt the domestic interest rate, R?t
the foreign interest rate, and Ft the profits of domestic firms.14 All prices are denoted in domestic
currency.
Following Schmitt-Grohé & Uribe (2003), it is costly for the household to hold foreign bonds, a
circumstance which is modeled by a term that is convex-increasing in foreign bonds and weighted
by χ > 0. The parameter χ serves as a measure of capital mobility (where the lower χ, the more
capital is mobile). This convex portfolio adjustment cost function also serves to induce stationarity
into the foreign debt process and to close the small open economy model.15 Note that these portfolio
14The superscript ? denotes throughout the paper that a variable or parameter belongs to the foreign economy. In
particular, foreign demand for domestic goods is denoted with the ? superscript. Et stands for the expected present
value at time period t of a function of future values.
15This approach comes to use in related papers with small open economy models, such as Pierdzioch (2004), Devereux
et al. (2006) and Punzi (2013). Schmitt-Grohé & Uribe (2003) show that portfolio adjustment costs are one way among
others (e.g., endogenous discount rate, debt elastic interest rate, complete asset markets) to get rid of the unit root problem
of net foreign assets in small open economy models. Most importantly, all approaches to eliminate this unit root problem
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costs are a dead-weight loss to the economy; they are not redistributed, a feature which will show
up in the general equilibrium condition of the model.
Together with the necessary transversality conditions to prevent the household from engaging in
Ponzi schemes,16 the deflated first-order conditions of the representative household can be expressed
as
(xct )
1/ξ−σω(xdc,t)
−1/ξ = λt pdt (2.6)
(xct )
1/ξ−σ(1−ω)(x fc,t)−1/ξ = λtrert p
f
t (2.7)
ψhφt = λtwt (2.8)
λt = βRt Et
(
λt+1
πt+1
)
(2.9)
λt = β
R?t
1 + χb ft
Et
(
et+1λt+1
etπt+1
)
, (2.10)
in which rert represents the real exchange rate, and b
f
t = etB
f
t are the real foreign bond holdings by
domestic households.17
2.2 Government
The domestic government forms deep habits of consumption at the level of each variety i, analo-
gously to the household. Following Ravn et al. (2012), this assumption is motivated by situations in
which the provision of a public good in one community, like for example garbage collection, street
lightning or traffic signals, creates the desire for these public services in another community.18
Hence we have:
xdg,t =
{∫ 1
0
[
gt(i)− θgsdg,t−1(i)
]1−1/η
di
}1/(1−1/η)
. (2.11)
In contrast to the household however, the government consumes domestically produced goods
only.19 xdg,t denotes the habit-adjusted composite good, while gt(i) represents the actual amount of
variety i that is consumed. The habit stock evolves according to
sdg,t(i) = ρs
d
g,t−1(i) + (1− ρ)gt(i). (2.12)
The government does not buy or issue any bonds and finances its expenditures by lump-sum taxes,
hence Tt = Pdt gt. Then, by integrating over all the varieties i, one obtains the amount of total
deliver virtually identical dynamics at business cycle frequencies, as measured by unconditional second moments and
impulse response functions.
16The transversality conditions is given by limt⇒∞ βtΩt+1Λt = 0, with Ωt = BH,t + StBF,t.
17In order to deflate the model, we make the following definitions: λt = ΛtPt, where Λt is the Lagrange multiplier,
Wt = wtPt, p
f
t = P
f
t /Pt, rert = etP
?
t /Pt, b
f
t = etB
f
t , and πt+1 = Pt+1/Pt.
18This is equivalent to a setup in which households value government expenditures in a way separable to the consump-
tion of private goods and leisure and form deep habits on the publicly provided goods. The same assumption is also
used for example in Cantore et al. (2012), Zubairy (2014a), Zubairy (2014b) or Jacob (2015).
19Trionfetti (2000) and Brülhart & Trionfetti (2004) report that governments appear to import significantly less than the
private sector does, i.e., there is substantial evidence of stronger home bias in government than in private consumption
for OECD economies. The assumption that xdg,t is completely home-biased is frequently used, for instance in Pierdzioch
(2004) and Gali & Monacelli (2008).
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government spending
Pdt gt =
∫ 1
0
Pdt (i)gt(i)di. (2.13)
Cost minimization yields a demand function which is analogous to the one of the representative
household:
gt(i) =
(
Pdt (i)
Pt
)−η
xdg,t + θ
gsdg,t−1(i). (2.14)
The habit-adjusted government consumption, xdg,t, follows an exogenous AR(1)-process with |γg| <
1 and εg,t ∼ N (0, σ2g):
xdg,t = γ
gxdg,t−1 + (1− γg)x̄dg + ε
g
t . (2.15)
Hence, when deciding to increase its expenditures, the government takes habit formation into ac-
count.20
2.3 Firms
There is imperfect competition among the goods-producing firms as in Chari, Kehoe & McGrattan
(2002), and firms face nominal rigidities in the form of price adjustment costs following Rotemberg
(1982).21 Each firm i is a monopolistic producer of a good of variety i, using linear technology with
labor (hours worked) as the only input, so its individual output yt(i) at time t equals ht(i). Firms
do not price discriminate between the domestic and export market, which means that the law of
one price holds for all goods at all times.22 Total domestic demand for variety i amounts to the
consumption demand arising from the domestic households, cdt (i), from the foreign economy (i.e.,
exports), cd?t (i), and from the domestic government, gt(i), which is expressed by yt(i) = ht(i) =
cdt (i) + c
d?
t (i) + gt(i). Note at this point that due to portfolio holding costs of the household, and
price adjustment costs of the firm, total demand of goods in the domestic economy amounts to
ht = cdt + gt + c
d?
t +
χ
2
(
b ft
)2
+
ϕp
2
(
πdt − 1
)2
ht. (2.16)
Firm i sets its price Pdt (i), which is denoted in domestic currency.
23 When the firm decides to
change its price, it faces a quadratic price-adjustment costs as proposed by Rotemberg (1982). The
20Note that this is in contrast to Ravn et al. (2012), who impose a stochastic shock to non-adjusted government consump-
tion. The latter implies that the government chooses to increase its expenditures on each variety i of goods by a given
percentage. We have tested this variant within our model. The results are consistent to our assumption, both concerning
the dynamics of the benchmark of as well as the comparison of the fiscal multiplier for the different scenarios of economic
openness (as presented in section 6).
21Up to a first order, Rotemberg and Calvo pricing deliver similar Phillips curves and aggregate dynamics of inflation
are equivalent.
22This assumption is common in the literature, see for example Gali & Monacelli (2005), Benigno & De Paoli (2010) or
Corsetti, Meier & Müller (2012a).
23We assume “producer currency pricing”, which implies complete exchange rate pass-through. Betts & Devereux
(2001) find that the degree of pass-through is relatively unimportant for the international transmission mechanism of
fiscal shocks, making this assumption frequently used in the open economy literature.
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cost function (in nominal terms) is given by
ϕp
2
(
Pdt (i)
Pdt−1(i)
− 1
)2
Pdt ht, (2.17)
in which ϕp > 0 determines the degree of nominal price rigidity and ht denotes total aggregate
supply in the symmetric equilibrium.24 As the firm makes its price-setting decision, it takes into
account the demand functions and the laws of habit stock evolution of the domestic and foreign
households and the government. This is crucial for the model’s predictions concerning the effects of
a fiscal expansion, as it induces firms to react to changes in aggregate demand by moving markups
in a counter-cyclical fashion. We will now explain the mechanism of counter-cyclical markups in
more detail.25
Each firm i faces an individual demand function (as in equations (2.4), (2.5)) of the form
cdt (i) =
(
Pdt (i)
Pt
)−η
xdc,t + θ
csdt−1(i). (2.18)
This individual demand is the sum of a price-elastic component,
(
Pdt (i)
Pt
)−η
xdc,t, and a price inelastic
component, θcsdt−1(i). The elastic component is proportional to the aggregate demand of the current
period, yt, while the inelastic component stems from the habit formation of past periods. Therefore,
the price elasticity of the individual demand function that firm i faces is a weighted average of η and
0. As a result of an increase in current aggregate demand at time t (caused by a fiscal expansion),
the weight of the elastic component increases, making the individual demand function more price-
elastic. In other words, the price elasticity of individual demand is pro-cyclical. This provides a
clear intra-temporal incentive for the firm to charge a counter-cyclical markup.
In addition, there is an inter-temporal incentive: As firms anticipate that the habit stock is a
weighted average of past sales, they face a dynamic profit maximization problem. By decreasing
the markup today, a firm can acquire ‘new customers’ which will return tomorrow as they will be
‘bound to their own habits.’ As the results will show, this inter-temporal incentive is strengthened
by the phase of transition after a fiscal shock, and firms are even able to slightly increase their
markup above the steady state level for a few periods, and hereby partly compensate for the initial
drop in the markup.
Firm i maximizes its expected future discounted profit function, taking into account the individ-
ual demand functions for each of the goods, cdt (i), gt(i) and c
d?
t (i), by choosing the optimal levels
of a set of variables S =
{
Pdt (i), c
d
t (i), gt(i), c
d?
t (i), s
d
c,t(i), s
d
g,t(i), s
d?
c,t(i)
}
, taking as given Φ0,t, Wt, Pdt ,
Pd?t , c
d
t , gt, c
d?
t , and the initial conditions s
d
c,−1(i), s
d
g,−1(i), and s
d?
c,−1(i):
max
S
E0
∞
∑
t=0
Φ0,t
{
[Pdt (i)−Wt] · [cdt (i) + gt(i) + cd?t (i)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
=yt(i)
−
ϕp
2
(
Pdt (i)
Pdt−1(i)
− 1
)2
Ptht
}
.
24Price adjustment costs of this type are used in similar settings for example by Dedola & Leduc (2001) and Devereux
et al. (2006). Note that these price adjustment costs are not a tax, but a dead-weight loss to the economy (think of
menu-costs, contracts that are costly to be changed, etc.)
25See Ravn et al. (2012) for a more detailed exposition.
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The first-order conditions of the symmetric equilibrium are then given by
0 = pdt yt − ϕp
(
πdt − 1
)
πdt ht − η
[
νc,t(cdt − θcsdc,t−1)
+νg,t(gt − θgsdg,t−1) + ν?c,t(cd?t − θ?sd?c,t−1)
]
+ βϕpEt
[
λt+1
λt
πdt+1
(
πdt+1 − 1
)
ht+1
]
(2.19)
wt = pdt − νc,t − (1− ρ)$c,t (2.20)
wt = pdt − νg,t − (1− ρ)$g,t (2.21)
wt = pdt − ν?c,t − (1− ρ)$?c,t (2.22)
$c,t = βEt
[
λt+1
λt
(ρ$c,t+1 − θcνc,t+1)
]
(2.23)
$g,t = βEt
[
λt+1
λt
(
ρ$g,t+1 − θgνg,t+1
)]
(2.24)
$?c,t = βEt
[
λt+1
λt
(
ρ$?c,t+1 − θ?ν?c,t+1
)]
, (2.25)
for which we define πdt = P
d
t /P
d
t−1, λt+1 = Λt+1Pt+1, and Wt = wtPt. Again, Λt is the Lagrange
multiplier of the representative household’s optimization problem. It is related to the firm’s discount
factor by assuming that Φ0,t = βjΛt/Λ0. Further, νc,t, νg,t, ν?c,t, $c,t, $g,t, and $
?
c,t are the Lagrange
multipliers of firm i’s optimization problem. Note that, since initial habit stocks are assumed to
be identical across different varieties, all domestic firms will charge the same price in a symmetric
equilibrium. It follows that in equilibrium, all prices and consumption quantities will be the same
across varieties i. In the following, we define the real markup per unit of output that the producer
gets in the symmetric equilibrium as µt ≡ pdt − wt.
2.4 Monetary policy
The domestic monetary authority sets the nominal interest rate following a Henderson-McKibbin-
Taylor type of a policy rule.26 Following Monacelli (2004), the rule is specified in a way that is
consistent with the present open economy framework. The following equation describes the target
for the nominal interest rate, R̄t:
R̄t = R̄
(
Pt
Pt−1
)γπ (yt
ȳ
)γy ( et
et−1
) γe
1−γe
. (2.26)
In a setting with active monetary policy, the central bank adjusts the nominal interest rate by putting
a weight to current inflation (γπ ≥ 1), deviations from steady state output (γy ≥ 0), and to changes
in the nominal exchange rate (γe ∈ [0, 1)).27 A purely floating exchange rate regime is characterized
by γe = 0. For any value of γe ∈ (0, 1) the exchange rate arrangement resembles a managed floating
26The rule is based on Henderson & McKibbin (1993) and Taylor (1993) and has found application in the open economy
context as for example Kollmann (2002), Monacelli (2004) or Devereux et al. (2006).
27We assume that the central bank targets the price change between the previous period and today. Schmitt-Grohé &
Uribe (2007) show that there are no welfare gains from targeting expected future values of inflation as opposed to current
or lagged values of these macroeconomic indicators.
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regime. The central bank achieves a strict peg by setting γe → 1. In the steady state, the target
interest rate equals R̄. Following Monacelli (2004), the monetary authority has the desire to smooth
changes in the nominal interest rate at a rate ρr such that the determination of the actual short-term
nominal interest rate, Rt, can be described as follows,
Rt = (R̄t)
1−ρR (Rt−1)
ρR . (2.27)
With this rule, the central bank sets a long-run target for CPI inflation, output and the nominal
exchange rate, and it adjusts the nominal interest rate as a feedback on short-run deviations from
this target:
Rt =
[(
Pt
Pt−1
)γπ (yt
ȳ
)γy ( et
et−1
) γe
1−γe
R̄
]1−ρR
(Rt−1)
ρR . (2.28)
2.5 Rest of the world
As in Clarida, Gali & Gertler (2001) and Gali & Monacelli (2005) among others, we treat the foreign
country as large relative to the domestic economy. Consequently, the domestic economy has no
effect on the steady state equilibrium conditions of the foreign economy. The foreign country has
the dynamics of a closed economy.28 The assumption that the law of one price holds at all times
implies that the foreign goods price paid by domestic households equals the foreign currency price
of foreign-produced goods, namely, etP
f
t = etP
?
t . For simplicity, only the consumption of domestic
goods by foreign households is part of the model (but not their consumption of foreign goods).
The foreign households have the same preferences as the households in the domestic small open
economy such that their consumption Euler equation must satisfy:
(
xd?c,t
)−σ
= βR?t Et

(
xd?c,t+1
)−σ
π?t+1
 , (2.29)
in which π?t+1 = P
?
t+1/P
?
t . Following the above mentioned literature, we represent the foreign prices
P?t and consumption of domestic goods by foreign households c
d?
t by exogenous and independent
AR(1)-processes,
z?t = γ
z?z?t−1 + (1− γz?)z̄ + ε?z,t, for z = x, π, (2.30)
with |γz?| < 1 and εz?,t ∼ N (0, σ2z?), and in which xd?c,t is the habit-adjusted composite good
xd?c,t =
{∫ 1
0
[
cd?t (i)− θ?sd?c,t−1(i)
]1−1/η
di
}1/(1−1/η)
. (2.31)
28See for example Gali & Monacelli (2005), Divino (2009), Faia & Iliopulos (2011) and chapter 6.5 in Walsh (2010) for
this approach.
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Foreign households form habits over consumption of domestic goods at the level of each variety i,
in the same manner as the domestic households do. The habit stock evolves according to
sd?c,t(i) = ρs
d?
c,t−1(i) + (1− ρ)cd?t (i). (2.32)
The foreign household minimizes its expenditure
∫ 1
0 c
d?
t (i)P
d?
t (i)/etdi, which gives rise to a demand
function for variety i of the following form:29
cd?t (i) =
(
Pd?t (i)
etP?t
)−η
xd?c,t + θ
?sd?c,t−1(i). (2.33)
2.6 Price Level and Inflation
We follow Cantore et al. (2012) and do not distinguish between habit formation of the government
and the households, that is we set θc = θg = θ? = θ. This implies that in equilibrium νc = νg = ν
and $c = $g = $.30
Similarly to Ravn et al. (2012), we define the consumer price index (CPI), Pt, as an expenditure
weighted average of the prices of the composite goods:
Pt = γPdt + (1− γ)etP
f
t , for which γ =
P̄d(c̄dc + ḡ)
P̄d(c̄dc + ḡ) + ēP̄ f c̄
f
c
. (2.34)
Hence, by defining pdt = P
d
t /Pt and with the law of one price, the definition of the domestic real
exchange rate (rert = etP?t /Pt) can be used to find:
1 = γ pdt + (1− γ) rert. (2.35)
The inflation rate of the domestic CPI, πt = Pt/Pt−1, is related to the price of the domestic good as
follows:
πdt =
Pd
Pdt−1
=
pdt Pt
pdt−1Pt−1
=
pdt
pdt−1
πt ⇒ pdt =
πdt
πt
pdt−1. (2.36)
The inflation rate of the foreign CPI reads π?t = P
?
t /P
?
t−1. The foreign CPI influences the domestic
CPI. The two are linked by
rert =
etπ?t
et−1πt
rert−1. (2.37)
2.7 Market clearing
In the equilibrium, all domestic households are identical and there is zero net-supply of domestic
bonds, Bdt = 0. The net return which the domestic economy attains from foreign bond holdings
must equal the trade balance (TBt). Expressed in real terms it must hold that
b ft =
et
et−1πt
R?t−1b
f
t−1 +p
d
t c
d?
t − rertc
f
t︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡TBt
. (2.38)
29Note that as the foreign economy is large relative to the domestic small open economy, we have that foreign domestic
prices Pd?t are equal to the foreign CPI P
?
t .
30As shown by Gali (1996), if this assumption is relaxed there exists the risk of multiple equilibria.
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Aggregate private consumption is the sum of domestically produced goods and imports, Ptct =
Pdt c
d
t + etP
f
t c
f
t . The trade balance in nominal terms is given by the difference between exports and
imports
TBt = Pdt c
d?
t − etP
f
t c
f
t . (2.39)
Adding up the budget constraint from the household, the firm and the government, the aggregate
market clearing equation can be written as follows:
Pdt yt = P
d
t c
d
t + etP
f
t c
f
t + P
d
t gt + TBt + Pt
χ
2
(
b ft
)2
+ Pdt
ϕp
2
(
Pdt
Pdt−1
− 1
)2
yt. (2.40)
2.8 Definition of equilibrium
Let us define the competitive general equilibrium of the present model as follows:31
Definition. Given the sequence of the stochastic shocks Z∞t=0 = {εg,t, ε?x,t}∞t=0 an equilibrium allocation
of this economy is a sequence of prices P∞t=0 = {Pt, Pdt , P
f
t , P
?
t , et, Rt, R
?
t , Wt}∞t=0, and quantities Q∞t=0 =
{Λt, νt, ν?t , $t, $?t , cdt , c
f
t , gt, c
d?
t , s
d
c,t, s
f
c,t, s
d
g,t, s
?
c,t, B
d
t , B
f
t , µt, x
c
t , x
d
c,t, x
f
c,t, x
d?
c,t , x
d
g,t, yt, ht}∞t=0 satisfying the fol-
lowing conditions: (i) the household’s allocation solves its optimization problem; (ii) the prices of the mo-
nopolistically competitive firms solves their profit maximization problem; (iii) the market-clearing conditions
hold; (iv) the government chooses its spending rule and (v) the monetary authority chooses an exchange rate
policy.
3 Calibration and Multipliers
In order to solve the nonlinear stochastic general equilibrium model, we take a first-order linear
approximation around the (zero-inflation) non-stochastic steady state.32 We have used values for
the structural parameters which are common in the open economy literature.33 The benchmark
calibration is reported in Table 1. Time is measured in quarters.
3.1 Calibration
Structural parameters. The discount factor β is such that the annual steady state interest rate amounts
to 4 per cent. We follow Gali & Monacelli (2005) by setting the parameter of relative risk aversion,
σ = 1, and the inverse of the Frish labor supply elasticity, φ, to 3. The parameters ψ and γ are
implicit. ψ corresponds to the weight of hours worked in the utility function and is set such that
agents devote 1/3 of their total time endowment to work. γ is the weight of the domestic price level
in the consumer price index. Following Faia & Iliopulos (2011), we set the elasticity of substitution
31Appendix A provides a detailed solution of the model and lists the complete set of model equations.
32For the simulation of the model, we use the DYNARE implementation for Matlab (http://www.dynare.org).
33See for example Clarida et al. (2001), Monacelli (2004), Gali & Monacelli (2005), or Faia & Iliopulos (2011).
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Table 1: Parameter values or ranges
Description Parameter Value
Structural parameters
Discount factor β 0.990
Relative risk aversion σ 1.000
Inverse Frish labor supply elasticity φ 3.000
Price adjustment cost parameter ϕp 55.000
Elasticity of substitution between differentiated goods η 8.000
Elasticity of substitution (d vs. f ) ξ 1.500
Weight of domestic prices in CPI γ 0.600
Weight of labor-disutility ψ 600.000
Habit mechanism
Habit persistence ρ 0.850
Habit formation θ 0.860
Openness parameters
Openness preference ω [0, 0.500, 1]
Capital adjustment χ [0, 0.0019, 0.01]
Monetary policy
Persistence (policy rule) ρR 0.790
Inflation coefficient (policy rule) γπ 1.500
Output gap coefficient (policy rule) γy 0.5/4
Exchange rate coefficient (policy rule) γe ∈ [0, 1)
Fiscal policy
Share of government spending sg 0.200
Persistence in government process γg 0.900
Steady state values
Steady state hours worked h̄ 1/3
Steady state inflation π̄ 1.000
among the different varieties of goods in the domestic economy to η = 8, implying a steady state
markup of 15%. We calibrate the parameter governing the price adjustment costs, φp, to generate
the same degree of nominal rigidity as the standard Calvo price adjustment process. As Keen &
Wang (2007) show, if η is equal to 8 and assuming a price adjustment on average after 4 quarters,
then φp is roughly 55. The elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign goods, ξ, is equal
to 1.5. This value is also used in Ravn et al. (2012) and common in the analysis of business cycles.34
Habit mechanism. In order to calibrate the parameter values of the deep-habit mechanism we rely
on the available literature by Ravn et al. (2006, 2012) and Cantore et al. (2012). We set the degree of
habit persistence, ρ, to 0.85, and the value of habit formation, θ, to 0.86.
Economic openness. Our main interest is to examine the impact of economic openness on the
fiscal multiplier in a New Keynesian model with deep habits. The first dimension of interest is
the degree of trade openness (i.e., the inverse of home bias in consumption). For the benchmark
calibration we follow Ravn et al. (2012) and set the degree of trade openness, ω = 0.5. This value
implies that households allocate the same fraction of their consumption basket to domestic and
34We have run simulations of the model for different calibrations, namely σ and φ ranging between (1, 5) and η, φp and
ξ set to 5, 25 and 3 respectively. Changing these structural parameters does not affect the qualitative implications of the
results presented in Table 2.
14
foreign goods. This parametrization implies an import share in GDP of 40%, a value frequently
used in the literature.35 To study the effect of trade openness we consider two extreme cases: (i) the
economy has 100% home bias when ω converges to 1. In that case we call it a zero trade economy;
(ii) when there is no home bias, i.e., ω → 0, households only consume foreign goods. This extreme
case is called a 100% trade economy. A further dimension of economic openness is the mobility of
capital, which is characterized by the parameter χ. Here we take the value used in Kollmann (2002)
for the benchmark simulation and set χ = 0.0019. This corresponds to a dead weight loss of 0.1%
of foreign bond holdings.36 International bond markets are perfectly integrated, i.e., we have high
capital mobility when χ → 0. As a benchmark for low capital mobility, we assume a dead weight loss
of 0.5%, that is, χ = 0.01.37
Monetary policy. The third dimension of economic openness is characterized by the degree of
exchange rate targeting by the central bank. We define a floating exchange rate regime by calibrating
γe = 0. This is a classical characterization of a monetary policy rule with which the central bank
only targets deviations in inflation and output. We call it an exchange rate peg, when γe → 1. Here,
the central bank’s target is to maintain changes in the nominal exchange rate constant. As to the
further parameters in the monetary policy rule, we follow the existing literature such as Taylor &
Woodford (1999) and set the response to inflation, γπ, to 1.5 and the response to output, γy to 0.5/4.
The degree of interest rate smoothing is ρR = 0.79 and taken from Chari et al. (2002).
Fiscal policy. The share of public consumption in output is equal to 20%. This value approxi-
mately corresponds to the mean of the government spending share in OECD economies. We are
interested in the consequences of a fiscal policy shock, hence the process of gt is the only stochastic
source in the model which we consider. As in Cantore et al. (2012), we set the calibration of the
exogenous process for government expenditures such that the parameter for auto-correlation, γg, is
0.9. The size of the fiscal policy shock equals 1 percent of steady state output.
In the steady state we have perfect price stability, i.e., π̄ = 1, which implies P̄ = P̄d = P̄ f = P̄∗ =
ē = ¯rer = 1 and R̄ = R̄∗ = 1/β.
3.2 Fiscal multipliers
The fiscal multiplier measures how real GDP changes when government spending increases by one
unit of domestic goods. For example, if a one-unit increase in government spending causes domestic
real GDP to increase by half a unit, then the multiplier is 0.5. We follow Ilzetzki et al. (2013) for the
calculation of two types of fiscal multipliers. On the one hand, we measure the change of real GDP
to a an increase in government spending when the expenditure shock occurs at t = 0. We define
35See for example Gali & Monacelli (2005) or Faia & Monacelli (2008).
36Since capital adjustment costs equal χ2
(
b ft
)2
, the share of foreign bond holdings which is lost equals χ2 (b
f
t ).
37Sutherland (1996) and Pierdzioch (2004) calibrate χ = 5 for low capital mobility. This would correspond to a dead
weight loss of 250%. We have tested our model also for values of χ equal to 1 and 5. The results for the fiscal multiplier
remain both qualitatively and quantitatively unchanged. See also Figure 1.
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the impact multiplier as:
impact multiplier =
∆y0
∆g0
. (3.1)
On the other hand, we wish to be able to study the multiplier effect over a long forecast horizon. To
this end we also report the cumulative multiplier obtained at horizon T:
cumulative multiplier(T) = ∑
T
t=0 ∆yt
∑Tt=0 ∆gt
. (3.2)
4 Results
Table 2 summarizes the main results of this paper. The impact and cumulative fiscal multipliers on
aggregate output are displayed for different degrees of economic openness. If not stated otherwise,
the calibration assumed corresponds to Table 1 and the exchange rate is floating.
Table 2: Economic openness and fiscal multipliers
Fiscal Multiplier
Economic Openness Calibration Impact Cumulative
Floating exchange rates (Benchmark) γe = 0 0.68 1.02
Exchange rate peg γe → 1 1.05 1.63
100% trade ω → 0 0.73 0.99
Zero trade ω → 1 0.78 1.47
High capital mobility χ = 0 0.66 0.71
Low capital mobility χ = 0.01 0.70 1.22
Notes: Impact multipliers are calculated at T = 0 and cumulative multipliers for T = 20,
e.g., a 5-year horizon. The shock is a one-percent increase in g0 (of domestic output). If
not stated otherwise, we calibrate the model with γe = 0, ω = 0.5 and χ = 0.0019.
Impact multipliers lie in the range of 0.67 to 1.05, while cumulative multipliers mostly lie above
one, which is consistent with conventional findings. We make three main observations: First, ex-
change rate flexibility clearly decreases the fiscal multiplier, both in the short and the long run.
While the impact multiplier under flexible exchange rates is below one (0.68 for the benchmark
calibration), it lies above one (1.05) under pegged exchange rates. The cumulative multiplier is 1.02
under flexible exchange rates and 1.63 when the exchange rate is pegged. This first finding is in line
with the empirical evidence obtained by Ilzetzki et al. (2013) and Corsetti et al. (2012b), who find
that the government spending multiplier is larger in countries which manage an exchange rate peg
than in those with flexible exchange rates.
Second, the cumulative multiplier depends negatively on the degree of trade openness. When
the economy is relatively closed with ω → 1, the cumulative multiplier amounts to 1.47. On the
contrary, when ω → 0 and the economy is open with respect to trade, the cumulative impact of a
fiscal policy shock amounts to 0.99. This finding is consistent with the traditional Mundell-Fleming
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model. Empirical evidence on trade openness and fiscal multipliers is limited. Ilzetzki et al. (2013)
find in their empirical work that open economies have negative long run multipliers while closed
economies have cumulative multipliers of around 1.1. At least qualitatively, our results are in line
with these empirical findings.
Third, the degree of capital mobility has a diminishing effect on the cumulative fiscal multiplier.
On impact, there is no notable difference. If capital mobility is low (e.g., χ = 0.01), the cumulative
multiplier amounts to 1.22 and is higher than in the benchmark. This finding is consistent with
conventional wisdom but stands in contrast to the theoretical results obtained by Pierdzioch (2004),
who claims that the output effect of a fiscal policy shock need not be lower in the case of high capital
mobility.
Figure 1 illustrates these three main findings and displays the robustness of the results. The
degree of trade openness (home bias) creates significant differences in the cumulative multiplier,
but has only negligible effects on impact. In the closed economy, fiscal policy is more effective than
in the open economy after 20 periods. The difference in fiscal effectiveness becomes even larger
regarding capital mobility. If capital is highly mobile between the domestic and foreign economy
(χ = 0), the fiscal multiplier has a hump-shape below 0.8. In the case of low capital mobility,
the cumulative multiplier is upward-sloping and lies above one after five periods. Under fixed
exchange rates (γe → 1), the cumulative fiscal multiplier exhibits a “hump-shaped” pattern, with its
maximum between 10 and fifteen periods. When the central bank lets the exchange rate float, the
cumulative multiplier is below one on impact and converges to unity after 10 periods.
5 Mechanism of a government expenditure shock
In this section, the dynamics that drive the fiscal multiplier will be discussed in detail. With regard
to the research question, we lay special emphasis on the role of economic openness.
5.1 Dynamics in the benchmark
Figure 2 presents the impulse responses of aggregate demand and its components as well as a
selection of other variables to a fiscal shock. The shock to government spending has a size of one
percent of domestic output. The model is linearly approximated around the zero-inflation steady
state and the impulse response functions (IRFs) represent level deviations from the steady state.38
The central bank follows a conventional Taylor rule without exchange rate targeting. In a first step,
we look at the model dynamics for the benchmark calibration given in Table 1.39
Following an increase in government expenditures, output increases. The dynamics of output
exhibit a hump-shaped pattern. Both consumption and the trade balance ‘crowd-out’ the effect
of the fiscal expansion. These dynamics of aggregate demand are consistent with the theoretical
predictions of the traditional Mundell-Fleming model and in line with the reported evidence for
38This representation allows for a direct comparison of IRFs. Multipliers are presented in Tables 2 and 3 and Figure 1.
39The magnitude of the impulse responses is in line with the dynamics reported by Cantore et al. (2012).
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Figure 1: Cumulative multiplier of output for different degrees of openness
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Notes: Impact multipliers are calculated at T = 0 and cumulative multipliers for periods
T = 1 : 20, e.g. a 5-year horizon. The shock is a one-percent increase in g0 (of domestic
output). If not stated otherwise, we calibrate the model with γe = 0, ω = 0.5 and χ =
0.0019. Trade openness: a higher value of ω implies lower trade openness. Capital mobility: a
higher value of χ implies lower mobility of capital. Exchange rate flexibility: a higher value
of γe implies lower flexibility.
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Figure 2: Impulse response functions in the benchmark
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Notes: Impulse responses show level deviations from steady state to a one percent increase in government expen-
ditures (of domestic output). We scaled the IRFs up by 100 to facilitate the reading. The exchange rate is fully
flexible, with γe = 0. The model is calibrated as in Table 1. As a reading example, consider the impulse response
of output: An increase in government expenditures by one percent of domestic steady state output (equals 0.0033
units of domestic goods) raises output by 0.0023 units of domestic goods. This corresponds to an impact multiplier
of 0.68, i.e., a percentage deviation from steady state of 68%.
countries with flexible exchange rates in Ilzetzki et al. (2013) and Corsetti et al. (2012b).40 Markups
react in a counter-cyclical fashion and decrease. The real wage and the level of domestic prices go
up. This changes the terms of trade. Domestic households react by buying more foreign goods,
while foreign consumers demand less of the domestic goods. The net inflow of goods corresponds
to a net outflow of money such that the exchange rate appreciates. Ravn et al. (2012) identify these
channels as the pricing-to-habits and domestic-relative-price effects.
The observed appreciation of the domestic currency outweighs the increasing prices of domestic
goods, hence CPI inflation falls. Under flexible exchange rates, the central bank follows active
monetary policy and reacts to changes in CPI inflation and output. It therefore lowers the nominal
interest rate. The fall in the CPI together with the (less strongly) decreasing nominal interest rate
leads to an increase in the real interest rate, which gives households an incentive to reduce their
net foreign assets position. The demand for foreign bonds falls, capital flows into the domestic
economy, so that the real exchange rate appreciates further. A similar behavior of the real exchange
rate was also observed by Corsetti et al. (2012b) and Ilzetzki et al. (2013) and relates to the notion
of monetary accommodation. With active monetary policy, the reaction of the monetary authority
40Note that we report a slightly negative consumption multiplier, which is in contrast to the dynamics reported in Ravn
et al. (2012). As shown by Jacob (2015) their result is sensitive to the degree of nominal rigidities in the model and hinges
on the assumption of non-separable preferences, which reduce the negative wealth effect of a fiscal expansion.
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plays an important role in determining the expansionary effect of fiscal policy.41
We identify two main channels which are responsible for the generation of these dynamics. Both
are related to the working of deep habits and the counter-cyclical markup. On the one hand we have
a negative wealth effect, which is typical for business cycle models. On the other hand we have a
substitution effect, which is due to the counter-cyclical firm markups. In the following we will discuss
these two channels.
5.2 Wealth effect
A standard outcome of the traditional real business cycle literature is that an increase in government
spending has a crowding-out effect on private consumption through its negative wealth effect on
the household’s budget.42 As the government raises the tax rate in order to finance its expenditures,
it takes resources away from each household. The government buys goods from the domestic firms
and so consumes a fraction of total output. Yet, the goods bought by the government are not
redistributed to the households or other agents in the economy such that they could be used in any
utility-delivering or productive way.43 Hence, households get poorer and therefore increase their
work effort. Aggregate output increases in response. We can see in Figure 2 that consumption
is crowded out, yet the effect is small. This implies that the negative wealth effect is partially
compensated by the substitution effect, which is due to the counter-cyclical markups.
5.3 Substitution effect (counter-cyclical markups)
The role of counter-cyclical markups for the fiscal multiplier is linked to the mechanism of deep-
habit formation which is explained in technical detail in Sections 2.1.1 and 2.3. In short, at the level
of the individual good, i, the deep-habit mechanism implies that having consumed i in the past
increases the marginal utility of future consumption of i for a given household. The monopolistically
competitive firms take advantage and set the wage rate and the price of their goods such that their
markups move in a counter-cyclical fashion. There are two reasons for this kind of behavior of the
firms. First, they take into account the intra-temporal effect of an increase in aggregate demand,
which raises the price elasticity of the demand each individual firm i faces. Second, by lowering
today’s markup, the firms can acquire customers that will return in the future.
As Figure 2 displays, it is mostly the changes in the real wage which affect the movements
in the markup and to a lesser extent the changes in the price of domestic goods. These results are
consistent with Ravn et al. (2012), who show that in response to a shock in government spending the
markup of domestic firms decreases, a result which is mainly based on an increasing domestic wage
rate (Ravn et al. (2012), Figures 3 and 4). Cantore et al. (2012) find that in response to a government
41See for example Davig & Leeper (2011) and Coenen et al. (2012) for discussions on how the effect of fiscal policy
differs across the specification of monetary policy.
42See Baxter & King (1993) for a thorough investigation of the effect of fiscal spending on aggregate demand compo-
nents using a standard real business cycle model.
43An alternative way of modeling is that households get direct utility from government expenditures, as it is done e.g.
by Gali & Monacelli (2008).
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spending shock, the real wage increases and does so virtually as a mirror image of the decreasing
firm markup (Cantore et al. (2012), Figure 1). The ‘deep’ habit formation is the cornerstone of these
kind of dynamics, as it introduces a substitution effect that is able to partly compensate the negative
wealth effect of public absorption with respect to private consumption. The decline in markups
shifts the labor demand curve outward, thereby increasing the real wage. In turn, households have
an incentive to substitute consumption for leisure. The impact response of consumption in response
to the fiscal shock may therefore be close to zero or only slightly negative.
In order to review the importance of the deep-habit mechanism for the output multipliers found
in Table 2, it is worthwhile studying the case in which deep-habit formation is absent. If the intensity
of habit formation, represented by the parameter θ, is turned down to zero, then the model goes back
to a more classic mechanism. Table 3 reports the fiscal multipliers (impact and cumulative) under
the benchmark calibration with deep-habit formation as in Table 2, and compares them to the case
where deep-habit formation is absent (θ = 0). Three observations stand out: (1) qualitatively, the
degree of economic openness affects the multiplier similarly under all three specifications, although
the effect is small when there is no deep habit formation; (2) without habit formation, θ = 0, the
fiscal multipliers are generally lower than in the benchmark, moreover the effectiveness of fiscal
policy decreases with time under all calibrations; and (3) with formation but without persistence,
θ = 0.86, ρ = 0, the implications for the fiscal multiplier are similar to the benchmark, although
quantitatively different.44
Table 3: Output multipliers and the role of the deep-habit mechanism
Benchmark No formation θ = 0 No persistence ρ = 0
Economic Openness Impact Cumulative Impact Cumulative Impact Cumulative
Floating exchange rates 0.68 1.02 0.20 0.18 0.46 1.19
Exchange rate peg 1.05 1.63 0.34 0.20 0.76 1.40
100% trade 0.70 0.99 0.21 0.18 0.53 1.19
Zero trade 0.70 1.10 0.43 0.32 0.59 1.93
High capital mobility 0.66 0.71 0.18 0.12 0.45 0.79
Low capital mobility 0.70 1.22 0.24 0.24 0.51 1.51
Notes: If not stated otherwise, the model calibration is as described in Table 1. The degrees of economic openness
are calibrated as in Table 2. Impact multipliers are calculated at T = 0 and cumulative multipliers for T = 20. The
shock is a one-unit increase in g0.
If agents do not form deep habits, then the demand which each individual firm i faces only
depends on the price-elastic component. Suppose now domestic public expenditures increase. This
shock causes aggregate demand to go up, but does not affect its price elasticity. Therefore, producers
have less of an incentive to lower their markup than in the presence of habit formation. This
incentive becomes even smaller as newly acquired customers cannot be inter-temporally bound to
the producer. In turn, the upward shift in labor demand is smaller and the real wage does not
44As the persistence of habit formation is not the key driver of the model dynamics, rather the parameter on habit
formation, θ, we restrict ourselves in the following to compare the case of no habit formation (θ = 0) to the benchmark
calibration.
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increase by as much. The absence of habit formation diminishes the substitution effect on the fiscal
multiplier.
Figure 3 illustrates the model dynamics when households do not form deep habits and compares
them to the benchmark model. Taking a closer look at the components of aggregate demand, we can
see that output reacts less strongly without deep habits. Further, although consumption falls more
on impact, it falls less over time. Finally, the trade balance deteriorates more strongly on impact,
converging back to zero after 20 periods. The dynamics of the trade balance are determined by the
accommodation of the central bank and its effect on the real exchange rate. Without deep habits, CPI
inflation only falls slightly. Therefore, the central bank does not lower the nominal interest rate by
much. Nevertheless, the real interest rate increases by an amount that makes holding foreign bonds
unattractive, hence capital flows into the domestic economy and the real exchange rate appreciates.
As foreign goods become relatively cheaper, households shift their consumption towards the foreign
good. Moreover, as the price of domestic goods increases, exports decrease. In turn, the trade
balance deteriorates and crowds out the effect of the increase in government spending. In short,
counter-cyclical markups and the formation of deep habits mitigate the negative wealth effect on
the domestic households and lead consequently to more efficient fiscal policy.
Figure 3: Model dynamics with and without deep-habit formation
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Notes: Solid lines for benchmark model with θ = 0.86 and dotted lines for model without deep habits, θ = 0.
One can ask the question whether it is true that real-world markups fall in response to a fiscal
expansion. For example, Perotti (2008) provides evidence from several countries based on structural
VARs (including the United States and the United Kingdom) which is consistent with the real wage
increasing in response to a fiscal policy expansion. In the present model, similarly to the model of
Ravn et al. (2012), the markup equals the inverse of the domestic real product wage. Therefore, real
22
product wages which have been reported to increase in response to a positive government spending
shock by Perotti (2008) are consistent with counter-cyclical markups.
6 Economic Openness
We characterize the degree of economic openness by three dimensions. First, the monetary author-
ity controls the flexibility of the exchange rate through the Taylor rule. Second, trade openness is
measured by the degree of home bias. The home bias parameter indicates how much weight the do-
mestic households put on the domestic and the foreign good in its aggregate consumption bundle.
Finally, we measure the degree of capital mobility by the cost which households incur to reallocate
their portfolio of domestic and foreign bonds. As reported in Section 4, all dimensions of economic
openness play an important role in determining the size of the fiscal multiplier. In the following,
they will be discussed separately.
6.1 Exchange rate flexibility
A natural question arising from the empirical findings in Ilzetzki et al. (2013) is how the exchange
rate regime affects the effectiveness of fiscal policy and whether a model is able to replicate the
empirical fact that fiscal policy is more effective under pegged exchange rates than under a float.45
As it is shown in Table 2, both the impact and the cumulative multipliers are significantly higher
under fixed than under flexible exchange rates.
We compare the transmission mechanism of a fiscal policy shock for the two exchange rate
regimes under consideration in Figure 4. Under floating exchange rates (solid lines), output reacts
less strongly than under fixed exchange rates. Both the trade balance and (to a lesser extent) private
consumption partly crowd out the effect of the fiscal expansion. These dynamics of aggregate
demand are consistent with the reported evidence in Ilzetzki et al. (2013) and Ravn et al. (2012).
If the exchange rate is pegged, the response of output (i.e., the impact multiplier) is larger than
one.46 The impact response of the trade balance is positive on impact, and the crowding-out of
consumption is mitigated. This finding is related to (1) a currency effect and to (2) a subsequent
intensification of the substitution effect described above.
6.1.1 Currency effect and exchange rate flexibility
The currency effect is related to the movement of the real exchange rate and is closely linked to the
stance of monetary policy. Under flexible exchange rates, the central bank reacts actively to changes
in CPI inflation and output, but not to changes in the nominal exchange rate.47 As we can see
45See also Corsetti et al. (2012b) and Born et al. (2013). Both studies report empirical findings which are consistent with
the conventional wisdom that fiscal policy is more effective under fixed exchange rates.
46Consider the impulse response of output: An increase in government expenditures by one percent of domestic steady
state output (equals 0.0033 units of domestic goods) raises output by 0.0035 units of domestic goods. This corresponds to
an impact multiplier of 1.05, i.e., a percentage deviation from steady state of 105%.
47We tested the model also when the central bank does not target deviations in output, i.e., with γy set to 0. The
qualitative implications of the model are robust to this specification.
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Figure 4: Dynamics under different exchange rate regimes
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from Figure 4, a fiscal expansion increases output while CPI inflation falls. This implies that the
nominal appreciation of the domestic currency outweighs the increasing prices of domestic goods.
Therefore we see a real appreciation of the domestic currency.48 Domestic households exploit this
appreciation and buy more foreign goods, while foreign consumers react by demanding less of the
domestic goods. Consequently the fall in the trade balance of the domestic economy partly crowds
out the demand effect of the fiscal policy shock. With an increasing real interest rate, making the
holding of foreign bonds relatively less attractive, households substitute foreign for domestic goods,
which leads to an inflow of capital to the domestic economy.
By contrast, under fixed exchange rates, the nominal interest rate has to stay constant over time.
CPI inflation increases after the impact, as domestic prices increase while the exchange rate is
rigid. The real interest rate decreases and the holding of domestic bonds becomes relatively less
attractive. Consequently, we experience an increase in the trade balance and an outflow of capital.
This crowding-in effect of the trade balance is the main reason why fiscal policy in our model is
more effective under fixed exchange rates.
6.1.2 Substitution effect and exchange rate flexibility
Besides the crowding-in of the trade balance through the currency effect, we also observe in Figure
4 that the crowding-out effect of consumption is less strong under fixed exchange rates. This fact
is related to the deep-habit mechanism and the working of counter-cyclical markups. Because the
48See Davig & Leeper (2011), Coenen et al. (2012) or Christiano et al. (2011) for a discussion of the accommodation
channel and its role for the transmission mechanism of fiscal policy shocks.
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price elasticity of demand is affected through deep habits, domestic firms will lower their markups
(see Figure 4). Under fixed exchange rates, the firms lower their markups more than under flex-
ible exchange rates, since the effect on aggregate demand is larger than when the exchange rate
is able to adjust. The decrease in the markup leads to an amplification effect in labor demand,
causing the real wage to increase more strongly. The demand of the domestic households for the
domestic goods goes up, reducing thereby the crowding-out effect of the fiscal policy shock. To sum
up, lower exchange rate flexibility mitigates the adjustment channel of the nominal interest rate,
causing markups to decrease more strongly and therefore reducing the crowding-out of private
consumption. Hence, fiscal policy is more effective under fixed exchange rates.
6.2 Openness to trade
As reported in Section 4, openness to trade decreases the cumulative fiscal multiplier.49 This result
relies on the the pricing-to-habits effect and the domestic-relative-price effect explained in Section
5.1. We remember that in the benchmark case of floating exchange rates, a fiscal expansion leads
to a decrease in the firm’s markup and causes the real exchange rate to appreciate. On the one
hand, the absorption of private consumption (the sum of domestically produced goods and im-
ports) has a positive effect on the trade balance and therefore on the multiplier.50 This effect ceteris
paribus decreases with the degree of home bias in household consumption. On the other hand,
the domestic-relative-price effect causes households to switch their expenditures towards foreign
goods, whenever the economy is not in autarky. This decreases the trade balance and hence the
fiscal multiplier. This effect ceteris paribus becomes weaker as home bias increases.
Figure 5 displays how the degree of trade openness affects the transmission mechanism of a fiscal
policy shock and helps us understand the results in Table 2. Let us first consider the case where
we are in autarky, that is households have 100% home bias (ω = 1). As households only consume
domestic goods, the trade balance is zero at all times and there is no domestic-relative-price effect.
This means there is no crowding-out of the trade balance which otherwise would reduce the fiscal
multiplier. Once the economy is opened (ω < 1), we observe a substantial crowding-out of the
trade balance. To sum up, we identify the dynamics of private consumption and the real exchange
rate as the main drivers for the effectiveness of fiscal policy in an open economy framework. Our
model highlights the important role of trade openness, as its implied effects have consequences for
the crowding-out of the trade balance and in turn for the fiscal multiplier.
6.3 Capital Mobility
One of the main messages from the results presented in Table 2 is that the cumulative multiplier
is larger when capital mobility is low. The degree of capital mobility affects the household’s con-
sumption and savings decision through the uncovered interest parity condition, which is given by
49See Corsetti & Müller (2006), Monacelli & Perotti (2006, 2010), Müller (2008), for related studies on the role of home
bias for the transmission mechanism of fiscal policy shocks.
50The decrease in total private consumption implies both a reduction in the demand for imported goods and domesti-
cally produced goods. See Erceg, Guerrieri & Gust (2005) for a detailed discussion.
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Figure 5: Dynamics under different degrees of trade openness
0 10 20
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
Output
D
ev
ia
ti
o
n
 f
ro
m
 S
t.
S
t.
0 10 20
−0.4
−0.3
−0.2
−0.1
0
Consumption
0 10 20
−0.6
−0.4
−0.2
0
0.2
Trade balance/Output
0 10 20
−2
−1
0
1
Markup
0 10 20
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
Domestic prices pd
0 10 20
−1
0
1
2
Real wage
D
ev
ia
ti
o
n
 f
ro
m
 S
t.
S
t.
Periods
0 10 20
−0.2
−0.1
0
0.1
0.2
Nominal interest rate
Periods
0 10 20
−2
−1
0
1
Foreign bonds
Periods
0 10 20
−1.5
−1
−0.5
0
Real exchange rate
Periods
0 10 20
−0.6
−0.4
−0.2
0
0.2
CPI inflation
Periods
Notes: 100% trade ω → 0; equal consumption share for h and f ω = 0.5; No trade ω → 1.
the combination of equations (2.9) and (2.10),
Rt =
R?t
1 + χb ft
Et
(
et+1
et
)
. (6.1)
This condition relates the domestic nominal interest rate to the foreign, subject to portfolio adjust-
ment costs, and the expected change in the nominal exchange rate. As the economy is small with
respect to the rest of the world, the foreign nominal interest rate is exogenous. As the initial net
foreign assets position in t = 0 is zero, the degree of capital mobility only has an impact from
t > 0 onwards. It takes at least one period for agents to decide on how to allocate their portfolio of
domestic and foreign bonds, taking into account the expected changes in the exchange rate.
To understand how the degree of capital mobility affects the cumulative output multiplier, let
us consider the dynamics depicted in Figure 6. Lowering the degree of capital mobility diminishes
the otherwise larger impact on the net foreign asset position in response to a fiscal expansion (as it
is described above in terms of the currency effect, see Section 6.1.1). High costs of reallocating bond
holdings during a fiscal expansion are implemented via a high value of the χ parameter. Instead of
lowering their demand for foreign bonds as when capital is perfectly mobile, households maintain
their foreign bond holdings constant. Consequently, the domestic currency appreciates less strongly.
While consumption decreases more significantly, we observe that the trade balance does not crowd
out the increase in government expenditures. As domestic prices do not increase by as much, they
lower the consumption of domestic goods by less than the consumption of imports.
These results challenge the findings by Pierdzioch (2004), who claims that higher capital mobility
can also increase the effectiveness of fiscal policy, when monetary policy is characterized by a simple
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Figure 6: Dynamics under different degrees of capital mobility
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money supply rule with price-level and output-gap targeting. We expand the analysis by Sutherland
(1996) and Pierdzioch (2004) as we formalize monetary policy with a commonly used Taylor rule.
Importantly, we show that in a model with counter-cyclical markups and active monetary policy,
the degree of capital mobility is inversely related to the cumulative effectiveness of fiscal policy.
This underlines the conventional wisdom of the Mundell-Fleming model.
7 Conclusion
This article adds to the recent debate on the dynamics of fiscal policy shocks and the size of govern-
ment spending multipliers by providing a positive assessment of fiscal policy effectiveness in open
economies. We incorporate the mechanism of deep-habit formation formalized by Ravn et al. (2006)
in a New Keynesian small open economy framework to compare three dimensions of economic
openness: (i) the flexibility of the exchange rate; (ii) the degree of trade openness; and (iii) the level
of capital mobility.
In line with recent empirical evidence, we show that fiscal effectiveness is higher when the
exchange rate is pegged. This finding has a direct implication on policy making because it relates
to the question whether fiscal policy measures in Eurozone countries during the past financial
crisis were effective. It also underscores the importance of monetary and fiscal policy interactions.
With monetary accommodation under floating exchange rates a decline in the trade balance and a
crowding-out of the effect of a fiscal expansion may result, even when counter-cyclical markups are
present and the crowding-out effect of private consumption is thereby reduced.
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A second finding with direct implications for policy making relates to the degree of trade open-
ness. Our theoretical model confirms the empirical evidence reported by Ilzetzki et al. (2013), who
indicate that fiscal multipliers are smaller in open economies than in closed ones. As Levy Yey-
ati, Sturzenegger & Reggio (2010) show, trade openness is strongly associated with the propensity
to peg the exchange rate. Eurozone countries typically display larger trade openness than closed
economies such as the United States. Hence, our results cast doubt on the effectiveness of fiscal
policy measures during the past financial crisis in these countries.
Third, we stress that higher capital mobility leads to lower fiscal multipliers. This result advances
the debate on fiscal policy effectiveness by highlighting the role of international financial market
integration for the propagation of fiscal policy shocks. Our results are in line with conventional
wisdom and Sutherland (1996), but in contrast to Pierdzioch (2004).
Although the results obtained in the present study reliably shed light on the influence of eco-
nomic openness on the size of the fiscal multiplier, a limitation of the applied framework is the
assumption of flexible wages. It would be an interesting extension to introduce nominal wage stick-
iness or to add labor market frictions to our proposed model. There is empirical evidence in Pappa
(2009) that a fiscal expansion leads to an increase in real wage and employment; this gives rise to
the question of how counter-cyclical markups and the fiscal multiplier would react if the adjustment
of wages is rigid.
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A Appendix
A.1 FOC of the Households with Respect to Foreign Bonds
Equation (2.10), the first-order condition of the representative domestic household with respect to
foreign bonds, B ft , is derived according to:
0 !=
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= Ptet + χPte2t B
f
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A.2 FOCs of the Domestic Firms
Similarly to the model by Ravn et al. (2012), the Lagrangian of firm i is given by
L = E0
∞
∑
t=0
Φ0,t
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where Φt,t+1 = βΛt+1/Λt, with Λt being the Lagrange multiplier. The demand functions of the
domestic household and the government yield the following conditions:[
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Hence, the FOC with respect to Pdt (i) can be re-written as:
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Further FOCs are given by
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Assuming that for a given type of good (domestic vs. foreign), a given type of consumer (private vs.
public), and a given location of a consumer (domestic vs. foreign), initial habit stocks are identical
across varieties i. Then, in a symmetric equilibrium, it must hold that Pdt (i) = P
d
t and therefore
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Therefore, the first-order conditions of the general equilibrium are equal to
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t−1(i), λt+1/λt = Λt+1Pt+1/(ΛtPt), and Wt = wtPt. We define p
d
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t /(P
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t ), where P
?
t is the foreign CPI which is exogenous to the domestic small open
economy. In combination with the definition of the domestic real exchange rate, rert = etP?t /Pt, this
yields rert p
f
t = etP
f
t /Pt. The last equality allows for simplification of the above mentioned budget
constraints of the producer’s problem. In a symmetric equilibrium, where there is no difference
between any of the agents i, it must hold that:
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A.3 List of Conditions of the General Equilibrium
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